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This Article describes how Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United
States I ("Zenith") made the treatment of export rebates of consumption
taxes an issue under the U.S. antidumping law. It explains the position
of the Department of Commerce ("Commerce") that dumping margins
should be calculated on a tax net basis (so that they equal the margins
that would be found in the absence of taxes), and offers a general criti-
cism of the argument in Zenith.
A. Consumption Tax Rebates Under the Antidumping Law
A dumping margin is essentially the amount by which the home-
* Senior Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, Department of Com-
merce; B.A., Boston College, 1975; J.D., University of Michigan, 1979; LL.M., Urije Universiteit
Brussels, 1980. The views expressed in this Article are the author's, and they do not necessarily
represent the position of the Department of Commerce. The author would like to thank Richard
Henderson, formerly a case analyst at the Department of Commerce, and David Mueller, Director,
Office of Countervailing Duty Compliance, Department of Commerce, for their assistance in devel-
oping the ideas in this Article.
I Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
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market price of a good exceeds its price in the United States.2 The calcu-
lation of dumping margins is complicated by the fact that almost every
free-market country levies a consumption tax on most goods sold in the
home market, but either refunds or does not collect ("forgives") 3 the tax
on exported goods. In such circumstances, the home-market price auto-
matically will exceed the U.S. price by the amount of consumption tax
forgiven on export (absent an offsetting adjustment).
Where the consumption tax rate in the foreign market is 15%, this
effect may be illustrated as follows.
Home Market United States
$100
+$ 15 (15% Tax)
$115 $90 (tax exempt)
Dumping Margin = $115 - $90 = $25
The tax net margin ($10) is increased by $15, solely as a result of the
forgiveness of the consumption tax on export. In order to avoid this re-
sult, section 772(d)(1)(C) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (the "Act") directs
Commerce to add an offsetting adjustment to U.S. price, in the amount
of the tax forgiven on export.4
For many years, Commerce did not apply the tax clause strictly ac-
cording to its terms. Instead, it deducted home market consumption
taxes from foreign market value, thereby eliminating the tax from the
dumping equation.5 Again using a 15% consumption tax, Commerce's
original procedure may be illustrated as follows:
FMV USP
$115 (incl. tax)
- $ 15 (tax)
$100 $90
Dumping Margin = $100 - $90 = $10
Commerce viewed this procedure as implementing the broad purpose of
the tax clause to offset any consumption-tax differential between the two
2 See Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 731, 781, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as
amended 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter Tariff Act of 1930].
3 The term "forgiven" is used to refer to the government practice of either not collecting or
refunding consumption taxes on export. Similarly, the term "export tax rebates" is used to describe
both practices.
4 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) directs Commerce to add to the U.S. price:
IT]he amount of any taxes imposed in the country of exportation directly upon the exported
merchandise or components thereof, which have been rebated, or which have not been col-
lected, by reason of the exportation of the merchandise to the United States, but only to the
extent that such taxes are added to or included in the price of such or similar merchandise when
sold in the country of exportation.
5 See, e.g., Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Television Receiving




markets, while avoiding several thorny problems inherent in adding a tax
adjustment to U.S. price.6
B. The Zenith Decision
In 1986, the Court of International Trade ("CIT") overturned Com-
merce's practice in Zenith, which arose from the second administrative
review of televisions from Japan.7 Zenith had three basic holdings.
First, Commerce was required to restore the consumption tax to foreign
market value and add the offsetting adjustment to U.S. price, as required
by the statute. Second, Commerce was required to calculate the tax ad-
justment by multiplying the home-market tax rate by the tax base of the
U.S. price, and adding that amount to the U.S. price (with no adjust-
ments).' Finally, Commerce was required to measure the incidence of
the consumption tax in the home market and limit the addition to U.S.
price to that proportion of the tax found to be "passed through" to home
market customers. Commerce has acceded to the first ruling, and now
adds an imputed tax to U.S. price, rather than subtracting the home-
market tax from foreign-market value. The Department has not ac-
ceded, however, to the second and third points. These are discussed in
detail below.
L Calculation of the Basic Tax Adjustment
Where there is dumping absent tax considerations, calculating the
tax adjustment on the basis of the lower U.S. price produces a smaller
addition to U.S. price, thereby raising the dumping margin. The follow-
ing equation illustrates this inflation of the dumping margin:
FMV USP
$115 (incl. 15% tax) $ 90.00
+$ 13.50 (15% tax)
$103.50
Dumping Margin = $115.00 - $103.50 = $11.50
The increase in the absolute margin over the tax-net level of $10 is
$1.50-i.e., the difference between the $15.00 home market tax and the
$13.50 tax imputed to the U.S. price. Because the tax adjustment has the
6 First, it eliminated the need to determine the hypothetical tax on the exported merchandise
not collected under foreign law. Second, by eliminating taxes from the equation, it avoided subse-
quent distortions in the ad valorem margin (or deposit rate) caused by adding the tax to U.S. price.
7 Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, from Japan; Final Results of Administra-
tive Review of Antidumping Finding, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,278 (Dep't Comm. 1985).
8 Absent any compensating adjustment, this would increase the dumping margin in any case
where the U.S. price was lower than foreign market value. See infra section B(l). The Court or-
dered Commerce to refrain from making any offsetting adjustment to foreign market value.
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practical effect of multiplying the dumping margin by the tax rate when
calculated in this way, the resulting increase in the margin has been
called the "multiplier effect." 9
In the Zenith litigation, one of the Japanese companies proposed
that the "multiplier effect" be eliminated by subtracting from foreign
market value as a circumstance-of-sale ("C-O-S") adjustment the amount
by which the home-market tax exceeded the imputed tax in the U.S. mar-
ket.'" In its determination on. remand, the CIT prohibited Commerce
from making such a C-O-S adjustment, and Commerce duly refrained."
In the next administrative review of televisions from Japan, how-
ever, Commerce adopted the consumption tax differential C-O-S adjust-
ment. Commerce first calculated the hypothetical tax not collected on
each export model by multiplying the home-market tax rate by the tax
base of the U.S. price, and added the product to U.S. price. It then offset
the amount by which the tax on home-market sales exceeded the imputed
tax on U.S. sales by deducting the excess from foreign-market value as a
C-O-S adjustment.' 2 That calculation may be illustrated as follows.
FMV USP
$115.00 (incl. 15% tax) $ 90.00
-$ 1.50 (C-O-S adjustment = +$ 13.50 (15% tax)
$15 - $13.50)
$113.50 $103.50
Dumping Margin = $113.50 - $103.50 = $10.00
This is the same margin that would have been found absent any tax in
the home market. In its final determination, Commerce stated that it
had made the C-O-S adjustment "to avoid artificially inflating or deflat-
ing margins"-in other words, to preserve tax net margins. 1 3 Zenith
challenged the adjustment in the CIT, and the issue is now before that
9 See Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1386 n.9.
10 Circumstance-of-sale adjustments are provided for by the Tariff Act of 1933, supra note 2,
§ 773(a)(4)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1982)).
11 See Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1392-94.
12 More precisely, Commerce equalized the amount of tax in the home and U.S. markets by
adjusting the foreign market price up or down by the absolute difference of the tax in each market.
As a matter of programming, this was accomplished by subtracting the home market tax from the
foreign market price and substituting the imputed tax on the sale in the United States.
13 Television Receivers, Monochrome and Color, From Japan; Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 53 Fed. Reg. 4051 (Dep't Comm. 1988). The C-0-S adjustment lowers
the deposit rate below the tax-net level because of the addition of tax to U.S. price, which is the
denominator in the deposit rate equation. Once tax is added to U.S. price, it is impossible to pre-





2. Calculation of Tax Pass Through
Commerce's traditional interpretation of the tax clause allowed an
adjustment offsetting the full home-market consumption tax, provided
that the tax had been charged and paid on the home-market sales being
compared. The Zenith decision required Commerce to limit the tax ad-
ded to U.S. price to that proportion of the home-market tax "passed
through" to home-market customers, in an economic sense. 15 In other
words, the Court directed Commerce to make the tax adjustment on the
basis of value (or the effect of the tax on the price) rather than cost (or
the amount of the tax).16
The following example illustrates the concept of "pass through."
Assume that a 15% tax is nominally added to the price of a $100 televi-
sion, so that the invoice reads "$100 + $15 = $115." Commerce would
regard this as a conclusive showing that the tax had been added to the
home-market price, as required by the statute. According to Zenith,
however, the inquiry may not end there. Zenith would also require an
analysis of whether the price would have been higher than $100 if there
had been no tax. If that analysis indicated that the price would have
been $105 if there had been no tax, this would signify that the manufac-
turer had succeeded in "passing through" to customers only two thirds
($10) of the tax, and had effectively "eaten" the remaining third ($5)
himself. This remaining third would create a dumping margin of $5, or
increase the margin by that amount.
Commerce devoted the first stage of the remand to determining how
it should measure tax incidence. After accepting briefs and holding hear-
ings on that issue, Commerce selected an econometric study as offering
the greatest potential for accurate results."' Econometrics uses the tech-
niques of statistical analysis to derive economic functions such as supply
and demand from empirical data about costs, prices, sales volume, and
the like. Because the accuracy of the results of an econometric analysis is
directly dependent on the size of the data base employed, Commerce was
compelled to require respondents to supply an enormous amount of in-
14 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, No. 88-2-00122 (Ct. Int'l Trade entered Jan. 14,
1988).
15 Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1394-1400.
16 Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1401. This aspect of the decision is discussed in more detail in sec-
tions II and V B below.
17 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, No. 85-06-00788 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 14, 1987)
(determination on remand) [hereinafter Determination on Remand] [on file at the Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. offices].
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formation. Even after this request had been pared to a minimum in re-
sponse to the respondents' pleas, it covered virtually all of their sales of
televisions over a ten-year period.18 Once the data had been received, it
was analyzed by means of a mathematical model that acted as a stand-in
for the structure of the television market in Japan.19 A final determina-
tion on remand was reached approximately one year after the order of
remand.2 °
The results of the study were perfectly consistent, from an economic
viewpoint, with Commerce's original assumption that the home-market
consumption tax was "included" in the price charged.2 From an ac-
counting standpoint, the assumption of full tax inclusion is straightfor-
ward where the price is higher than total cost. The econometric study
indicated that the economic burden of the tax was also shifted forward to
consumers in Japan during the review period.22
After the remand results had been affirmed, Commerce appealed the
"pass-through" aspect of the Zenith decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.23  That court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that
because the result Commerce obtained on remand was the same as that
18 See Determination on Remand, supra note 17, at 48 and Technical Appendix.
19 Commerce lacked the necessary expertise in econometrics to conduct the study, and was
forced to hire a Ph.D. econometrician at a cost of $25,000 to perform the core of the analysis. See id.
at 16-44.
20 The econometric model used in the Japanese remand is generally explained in Commerce's
Determination on Remand. The details of that model are not (and could not be) explained here. A
good idea of the complexity of the undertaking may be obtained, however, by reflecting on the fact
that the formula used by Commerce's econometrician to specify the demand function for televisions
in Japan was:
lnQ = vo + vlt + v2 + v3t3 v41nI + nclnPc + nblnpb + e2
Although the model employed was "state of the art" in sophistication, the accuracy of the
results was nevertheless limited by: (1) potential statistical errors in processing the data; (2) the
accuracy of the assumptions about firm behavior inherent in the study; (3) inadequacies in the data;
(4) difficulties in constructing the economic model; and (5) the uncertainty inherent in extrapolating
from the data obtained. Id. at 20-27, 45-50. Consequently, the measurement obtained on remand
may be regarded as only a reasonable estimate (although perhaps the best obtainable) of the inci-
dence of the commodity tax in Japan. Because Zenith did not challenge the results of the
econometric study, the methodology it employed has never been judicially reviewed.
21 See Determination on Remand, supra note 17, at 54-56.
22 In fact, the econometric study indicated that one manufacturer (Matsushita), as a result of the
tax, was able to add 117% of the tax to its price. Commerce did not increase U.S. price by more
than the amount of the tax, however, because more than 100% of the tax cannot have been forgiven
by the Japanese government. See id. at Table 1.
23 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 875 F.2d 291 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The government did
not appeal the Court's instructions prohibiting the C-O-S adjustment because it was essentially
dicta-Commerce had not made the prohibited adjustment in the administrative proceeding, so
there was no administrative record on which to base an argument on appeal. The C-O-S issue will be
appealed, if necessary, should the CIT strike it down in a subsequent administrative review.
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obtained in the administrative review, the CIT's judgment affirming the
remand results was not adverse to the Government, and thus there was
no case or controversy to sustain the appeal.24
C. The Daewoo Decision
In the spring of 1989, the same CIT court that decided Zenith ap-
plied that ruling to an administrative review of televisions from Korea.25
In accordance with the court's order of remand, Commerce again ex-
plored various means to estimate tax incidence and concluded that only
an economic study would provide the required measurement. 26 Com-
merce devised a second econometric questionnaire, which required the
Korean respondents to submit ten years of price data on a quarterly ba-
sis, in addition to a broad range of general information about the Korean
market.27 The final results of the Daewoo econometric study were re-
ported to the CIT in April 1990.28 They indicated that, as with con-
sumption taxes on televisions in Japan, 100% of the Korean
consumption taxes were borne by home-market customers in Korea dur-
ing the period of review. The tax pass-through issue is also being liti-
gated in the context of the antidumping order on televisions from
Taiwan.29
D. The Paver Parts Decision
The tax pass-through issue was also raised in a challenge to Com-
merce's final determination in an administrative review of replacement
parts for self-propelled bituminous paving equipment from Canada.3 0
This challenge, originally brought by the domestic petitioners in the
24 See id
25 See Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 931 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1989).
26 See Motion for an Extension of Time to File Remand Results Filed with the Court of Interna-
tional Trade, Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 931 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1989) (No. 85-
01-00140).
27 See Letter from Richard W. Moreland, Director, Office of Antidumping Compliance, to Re-
spondents in the Korean Televisions Proceeding on Remand in Commerce No. A-580-008 (Oct. 6,
1989).
28 See Determination on Remand, Appendix A, Measurement of Tax Incidence in the Korean
TV Home Market, on file in Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 931 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1989) (No. 85-01-00140).
29 See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, No. 87-01-0039 (Ct. Int'l Trade filed Jan. 6, 1987).
A decision of the court is pending.
30 Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada; Final Re-
sults of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 12,467, amended, 54 Fed. Reg.
19,581 (Dep't Comm. 1989).
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CIT,31 was essentially transferred to a Bi-National Panel ("Panel") under
the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement when the Canadian re-
spondents requested a Panel review. 32 Largely the same arguments con-
cerning tax pass-through were made before the Panel as were made
before the CIT in Zenith. The Panel, however, explicitly declined to fol-
low Zenith and ruled that the statute did not require a measurement of
tax incidence.33
Commerce's approach to the tax issues is based on the proposition
that the statute is intended to redress price discrimination by individual
firms. Accordingly, the extent to which consumption taxes change firm
prices so as to magnify or reduce dumping margins is a distortion that
should be eliminated. On the other hand, the approach to the tax issues
implicit in Zenith is that the statute also is intended to redress any differ-
ence between the foreign-market and U.S. prices caused by differences in
taxation (calculated in accordance with Zenith). Foreign firms must an-
swer, not only for their pricing decisions, but also for the effect of na-
tional differences in taxation on those decisions. A response to the
Zenith approach is offered below.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This Article will leave to economists the broad issue of whether the
law of comparative advantage would be better served by dumping mar-
gins calculated on a tax-net or tax-inclusive basis. Commerce's experi-
ence with the tax issues to date, however, suggests a few general
observations regarding the treatment of export tax rebates under the an-
tidumping law.
First, the Zenith decision treats consumption taxes as integral to
dumping.34 Admittedly, some consumption taxes are an element of final
prices charged to consumers and could be described as integral to those
prices. It is less clear that consumption taxes are integral to dumping per
se. For example, consider a consumption tax imposed strictly at the re-
tail level. Because many dumping investigations compare prices purely
at the wholesale level,35 they would not take retail-level taxes into ac-
31 Blaw Knox Construction Equipment Corp. v. United States, No. 89-05-00285 (Ct. Int'l Trade
filed May 25, 1989).
32 See U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Article 1904 Bi-National Panel No. U.S.A. 89-1904-
03 (decided Mar. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Paver Parts].
33 Id.
34 The accompanying Article specifically claims that consumption taxes are integral to dumping.
See Henderson, Taxes, Market Structure, and International Price Discrimination, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 244, 247 (1989) [hereinafter Henderson].
35 In some dumping investigations, all of the U.S. sales are wholesale because they are made to
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count, notwithstanding the fact that they would be included in the price
charged to the ultimate consumer and could influence the wholesale
price. Similarly, where foreign-market value is based on constructed
value, there is no tax in foreign-market value,36 notwithstanding the fact
that a consumption tax normally is added to the final price charged in
the home market. In short, the statute provides for the calculation of
dumping margins on a tax-net basis in certain instances, implying that
consumption taxes are not really "integral" to dumping. At the very
least, the assertion that taxes are "integral" to dumping needs to be
proved, and it is not clear that the answer is economic, rather than
political.
Second, calculating the tax forgiven "by reason of export"3 7 to be
added to U.S. price is an inherently speculative exercise. Determining
the tax forgiven requires Commerce to calculate either: (a) the amount
of tax that the foreign government would have collected had it taxed the
export sale; or (b) the amount of tax that the foreign government would
have collected had the product sold in the United States been sold in the
home market. The statute gives no indication as to which of these two
inquiries is intended.
Whichever answer is posited, intractable difficulties arise. On one
hand, if Commerce attempts to calculate an imputed tax on export sales,
it must determine what tax base the foreign government would have
used. Because the foreign government does not tax exports at all, the
answer is unavoidably hypothetical. On the other hand, if Commerce
attempts to calculate the tax that would have been assessed on the U.S.
product had it been sold in the home market, it must adjust the home-
market tax base for the usual physical differences between the U.S. and
home-market products. In making such adjustments, Commerce would
be forced to speculate as to how such differences would have altered any
selling expenses included in the home-market tax base. At present, Com-
merce prevents these factors from distorting dumping margins by using
the circumstance-of-sale adjustment disallowed in Zenith to equalize the
taxes in each market.
Third, calculating dumping margins on a tax-inclusive basis will
cause those margins to differ on the basis of tax rates. For example, take
Firm A, located in Country A, which does not levy any consumption
an independent U.S. importer. In such cases, the comparison home-market sales would also be at
the wholesale level.
36 See Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 2, § 773(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982)).
37 Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 2, § 772(d)(1)(C) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C)
(1982)).
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taxes. Firm A sells widgets in Country A for $100 and in the United
States for $90. The dumping margin is $10.38 If a 15% consumption tax
is introduced in Country A and rebated on export, the addition of the tax
to the U.S. price (with no offsetting C-O-S adjustment) will raise the mar-
gin to $11.50.1 9 Thus, the size of the dumping margin depends in part on
how country A chooses to raise revenue. If the government of Country
A elects to levy indirect taxes, higher dumping margins will be assessed
than if it had relied on direct taxes to raise the same amount of revenue.
The dumping margin thereby punishes a practice which may be an im-
portant economic policy in Country A and which, in any event, is quite
beyond the control of Firm A, which is penalized by the higher margin.
The fact that dumping margins would be affected by consumption
tax rates leads to the second consequence of calculating margins in ac-
cordance with Zenith, which is that dumping margins will vary from
country to country with tax rates. For example, assume that, in addition
to Firm A in Country A, Firm B in Country B and Firm C in Country C
also sell widgets at $100 in their home markets and $90 in the U.S. mar-
ket. The only difference between the three countries is that Country A
has a 15% consumption tax, Country B has a 10% consumption tax, and
Country C has a 5% consumption tax. Absent a device to equalize con-
sumption taxes in the foreign and U.S. markets, this would lead to three
different dumping margins. Although the tax-net pricing decisions made
by each firm are identical, the dumping margins will vary with the indi-
rect tax rate in each country.4
Fourth, every expense adjusted for in an antidumping equation is
susceptible to an economic "pass-through" analysis. For example, a for-
eign manufacturer might claim an adjustment to home-market price to
offset freight charges it paid in the home market. Just as with taxes, the
fact that the manufacturer paid the bill does not establish that it was able
to shift the entire economic burden of the freight expense onto its cus-
tomers. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to base just one adjustment
38 $100 - $90.00 = $10.00.
39 The margin calculation is as follows:
FMV USP
$100 $ 90.00
+$ 15 (tax) +$ 13.50
The margin calculation is: $115 - $103.50 = $11.50. With no taxes, the margin would have
been $100 - $90.00 = $10.00.
40 A's margin is $11.50 ($115.00 - $103.50); B's margin is $11.00 ($110.00 - $99.00); and C's
margin is $10.50 ($105.00 - $94.50).
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in a dumping equation (out of approximately twenty)41 on economic fac-
tors, while all of the others are based on cost. Whatever advantage econ-
omists might find in making the tax adjustment on an economic basis
would likely be diluted to insignificance in such circumstances.
Fifth, it would be inconsistent to calculate supply and demand elas-
ticities in the home market (for the purpose of limiting adjustments to
either home-market or U.S. prices) and not also calculate supply and
demand elasticities in the U.S. market for the purpose of generally limit-
ing adjustments to U.S. price.4 2 For example, the statute provides for the
deduction of commissions from the U.S. price in certain circumstances.43
It is not clear, however, that such commissions are entirely passed
through to U.S. customers in the form of higher prices. Only an
econometric analysis could determine the exact degree of "pass-
through." Accordingly, in order to calculate dumping margins entirely
on an economic basis, it would be necessary to produce economic models
of both the foreign and U.S. markets.'
Sixth, because virtually every free-market country in the world re-
bates consumption taxes on export,45 acceptance of the approach implicit
in Zenith would force Commerce to measure home-market tax incidence
in virtually every dumping proceeding. This would create vast problems
because the econometric studies that Commerce has concluded are neces-
sary to produce measurements of tax incidence are so mathematically
complex that they cannot readily be understood even by many trained
economists. Consequently, the Commerce Department would have to
continue subcontracting those studies to outside specialists at substantial
expense, or else hire a corps of econometricians to do the work.
More importantly, virtually no individuals currently involved in the
41 See Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 2, §§ 772(d) & (e), 773(a)(4) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1677a(d) & (e), 1677b(a)(4) (1982)).
42 Although the tax adjustment is made to U.S. price, the market analysis required is of tax
incidence in the home market, and this would more normally relate to adjustments made to the
home-market price.
43 See Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 2, § 772(e)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(1) (1982)).
44 In fact, the entire U.S. dumping law is premised on the assumption that U.S. importers (who
must pay antidumping duties) pass them through into the prices they charge their U.S. customers.
This assumption might not be correct.
45 See, e-g., PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL 97 (1986) [hereinafter DOING
BUSINESS IN BRAZIL]; PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 174 (1983) [hereinafter
DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA]; PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY 148 (1983)
[hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY] (like Germany, every member state of the European
Economic Community rebates a value-added tax on export); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSI-
NESS IN KOREA 74, Appendix X (1987) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN KOREA]; PRICE
WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 152 (1984); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS
IN TAIWAN 120 (1984).
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administration of the antidumping law will be in a position to critique the
results of these studies. This includes the administrative and legal staff of
the Department of Commerce, the private bar, and the judges who must
review these decisions. It is safe to say that the overwhelming majority
of these individuals will never understand the mathematics involved.
Both administrative and judicial review will have to proceed by proxy,
with the econometric analysis being delegated to the mathematical spe-
cialists, and the results accepted on faith. For example, if the parties
disagree about whether there is substantial evidence that 94.5% of a par-
ticular consumption tax is passed through to home-market customers,
there will be no direct way for a court to evaluate that evidence.
Seventh, econometric analysis is dependent on large amounts of data
spanning several years. Small companies, companies in developing coun-
tries, and companies that have changed ownership during the years for
which data are needed often will not be able to produce the required
information.4 6 In such cases, Commerce may be compelled to assume, as
the best information available,4 7 that a low percentage of the tax was
passed through to home-market customers, raising their dumping mar-
gins in proportion to the applicable consumption tax. Any other course
of action would reward non-compliance. Thus, acceptance of the Zenith
decision likely will generate substantial dumping margins in many
cases, 4 8 owing to respondents' simple inability to supply the data neces-
sary to measure tax incidence. The burden will fall most heavily on those
companies that can least afford it-small companies and companies in
developing countries.
Eighth, the information collected by Commerce to date indicates
that, at least insofar as consumption taxes are concerned, making the
46 During the Zenith remand, three out of five of the Japanese respondents could not provide
sufficient information to support specific econometric estimates of their tax shifting. A fourth com-
pany was able to provide the bare minimum of data required to produce an estimate, but this was not
enough for Commerce's outside econometrician to give even a rough estimate of the accuracy of his
results. This is particularly significant in light of the fact that the four companies in question (Mit-
subishi, NEC, Fujitsu, and Victor) are among the most sophisticated industrial concerns in the
world. See Determination on Remand, supra note 17, at 48 & Table 1.
It should be noted in this regard that Commerce normally gives respondents 45 days (plus one
fifteen-day extension) to answer already lengthy antidumping questionnaires. The tax incidence
questionnaire would have to be answered within this same time period.
47 See Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 2, § 776 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1982)).
48 Assuming no dumping margins otherwise, the potential dumping margin equals the amount
of the tax. The rates of consumption taxes range from: the 9% sales tax in Canada, DOING Busi-
NESS IN CANADA, supra note 45, at 174; and the 10% value-added tax in South Korea, DOING
BUSINESS IN KOREA, supra note 45, at 88; to the 14% value-added tax in West Germany, DOING
BUSINESS IN GERMANY, supra note 45, at 149; to the 16-17% sales tax (to which an excise tax is
often added) in Brazil, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL, supra note 45, at 109.
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adjustments on an economic basis probably will have little, if any, effect
on dumping margins, provided that the respondent can supply the neces-
sary information.4 9 Apparently, most manufacturers of mass-produced
goods have costs of production that remain roughly constant as produc-
tion increases.50 Economists appear to agree that constant-cost produ-
cers generally shift consumption taxes entirely onto consumers.51
Moreover, the economic logic of dumping is that high profits in the home
market are used to subsidize low-profit sales in the United States. Produ-
cers who are reaping high profits in their home markets are also likely to
possess the market power to shift consumption taxes forward to their
customers.
5 2
In sum, requiring that dumping margins be calculated on other than
a tax-net basis could make sense, if at all, only under a completely differ-
ent antidumping statute.53 Such a statute would tell Commerce how to
calculate the imputed tax on export sales, and generally place the entire
calculation in each market on the basis of value. Calculating dumping
margins in this manner would be so complex and burdensome that it
would be nearly impossible for small or unsophisticated companies to
participate, and Commerce determinations would be fully understood
only by professional econometricians. The margins obtained would vary
with the tax laws of the exporting country and the size and sophistication
of the responding firm. Apparently, however, no substantial difference in
dumping margins would result from limiting the tax adjustment in ac-
cordance with home-market tax incidence.
49 In the Japanese televisions case, at least, there was absolutely no difference in the margins
attributable to the tax pass-through analysis. See Determination on Remand, supra note 17, at 55-
56.
50 Evidently, this assumption generally holds true unless one of the factors of production is in
limited supply. For example, a manufacturer of catalytic converters might, in attempting to expand
his output indefinitely, trigger an increase in the price of platinum, raising his costs and limiting his
ability to pass them through to his customers. Similarly, producers with severe limitations of labor
or capital might cause their costs to rise by increasing production, inhibiting their ability to shift the
incidence of a consumption tax onto consumers. Crandall, The Effect of the Japanese Commodity
Tax on the Price of Television Receivers in Japan (submitted on Behalf of Respondents Oct. 1, 1986)
(on file at Dept. of Commerce Reading Room B-099 in the antidumping proceeding Television Re-
ceivers, Monochrome and Color, From Japan; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, 53 Fed. Reg. 4051 (Dep't Comm. 1988), and with the CIT in the record of the Determina-
tion on Remand, supra note 17).
51 Id.
52 The economic study performed on the Japanese TV market indicated that at least one com-
pany was actually able to increase its home market price by more than the amount of the tax, as a
result of the tax. See Determination on Remand, supra note 17, at Table 1.
53 The accompanying Article does not quarrel with this assertion. See Henderson, supra note
34.
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III. TAX-NET MARGINS UNDER GATT
No GATT provision specifically authorizes the rebate of indirect
taxes on exports. That GATT authorizes such rebates is nevertheless
clear from the various provisions of the treaty which touch on the issue.
First, Article III provides that: "The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly, or indi-
rectly, to like domestic products. . . ."" This provision is designed to
ensure that imported goods do not bear a greater tax burden than domes-
tic goods, so that they can compete on equal terms in that respect." This
intent would be thwarted if the exporting country were not permitted to
forgive its internal consumption taxes on export. 56 In that case, the im-
porting country's consumption taxes subject the goods to double
taxation.
The implication of Article III of GATT that border tax rebates are
permitted is made more explicit by Article XVI, on export subsidies,
which provides that: "The exemption of an exported product from duties
or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consump-
tion.., shall not be deemed to be a subsidy." 57 This provision is neces-
sary to achieve the larger goal of Article III of ensuring that imported
goods compete with domestic goods on equal terms, insofar as consump-
tion taxes are concerned. Adding export tax rebates to the price of goods
in the United States in the form of countervailing duties would subject
them to double taxation just as surely as if the rebates were eliminated
altogether.
54 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, at Art. III (effective Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
55 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Superfund Excise Taxes, 27 I.L.M. 1596, 1612-13 (1988), which describes Article III as fol-
lows: [I]t protects expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and domestic prod-
ucts. A change in the competitive relationship contrary to that provision must consequently be
regarded ipso facto as a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the General
Agreement."
56 See, e.g.,.J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 294-95 (1969):
Although the border tax adjustment is not governed directly by Article III of GATT, it is
appropriate to discuss it ... because it reflects a desire to equalize domestic tax treatment on
goods consumed domestically, whether domestically produced or imported, and a desire to re-
lieve other goods (exports) of that burden. . . . This problem has two sides, however: the
imposition of an equalizing tax on imported goods, on the one hand, and the revision or exemp-
tion from domestic taxes on exported goods, on the other hand.
57 This principle was also recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978). Article VI(4) reinforces this provision by providing that any
excessive rebate of indirect taxes may be treated as a countervailable subsidy. GATT, supra note 54,




For the same reason, GATT does not permit export tax rebates to
increase dumping margins. Offsetting export tax rebates through an-
tidumping duties would simply provide another way of nullifying the ba-
sic GATT rule that export subsidies are not unfair trade practices.
Consequently, Article VI(1) of the GATT provides that [in calculating
dumping margins]: "Due allowance shall be made in each case for differ-
ences in conditions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for
other differences affecting price comparability."58
In requiring that "due allowance" be made for "differences in taxa-
tion" and "for other differences affecting price comparability," Article
VI(1) implies that a difference in taxation is a difference in price compa-
rability, per se. It follows that differences in taxation must be offset in the
same manner as discounts or rebates given directly by the seller to the
buyer which, as we have seen, are not subject to pass-through analysis
even under U.S. law. To the extent that there is any doubt as to how
much allowance is "due" under GATT for differences in taxation, the
answer is supplied by Article VI(4), which provides that: "No product of
... any contracting party.., shall be subject to anti-dumping or counter-
vailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or
taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the
country of origin or exportation."59
In sum, export tax rebates are not recognized as an unfair trade
practice under GATT, and no method of penalizing such rebates on im-
portation is permissible under GATT. Accordingly, the treaty requires
that antidumping duties be imposed in such a way that no duties are
imposed "by reason of" export tax rebates. If Commerce were to in-
crease dumping margins either by the increment caused by applying the
home-market tax rate to the lower U.S. price or by the proportion of
indirect taxes forgiven on export which it determined was not "passed
through" to home market customers, that increase would indisputably be
"by reason of" the exemption of the imported product from taxes "borne
by the like product" in the home market.
Although U.S. law prevails when it conflicts with the GATT,6  U.S.
courts should at least avoid resolving ambiguities in the antidumping law
58 GATT, supra note 54, at 61 Stat. A23.
In addition, Article 2, paragraph 6, of the GATT Antidumping Code provides: "In order to
effect a fair comparison between the export price and the domestic price in the exporting country [in
calculating dumping margins] ... due allowance shall be made.., for the differences in taxation"
between the two markets. Agreement on the Implementation of Article XI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Article 2(f), signed on June 30, 1967, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 926 (1967).
59 GATT, supra note 54, at 61 Stat. A23.
60 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1982).
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in ways that violate that treaty. The Restatement of U.S. Foreign Rela-
tions Law provides: "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to
be construed so as not to bring it into conflict with international law or
with an international agreement of the United States."' 61 The CIT has
recognized the "necessity and desirability whenever possible, of harmo-
nizing [the antidumping] law with the international agreements it was
intended to implement."62 As discussed below, there is little question
that it is "fairly possible" to interpret and apply the tax clause to yield
tax-net margins.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX ADJUSTMENT
The legislative history of the tax provision is entirely consistent
with, and in many instances supports, the proposition that dumping mar-
gins should be calculated on a tax-net basis.
A. The 1921 Antidumping Law
The 1921 antidumping law, which remained in effect until 1974,
provided for the treatment of export tax rebates as follows:
[T]he purchase price of imported merchandise shall be the price at which
such merchandise has been purchased . . .plus the amount of any taxes
imposed in the country of exportation upon the manufacturer, producer, or
seller, in respect to the manufacture, production, or sale of merchandise to
the United States.
63
The intent of the new adjustment was to offset that portion of the
price differential between the foreign and U.S. markets caused by differ-
ences in taxation between the two markets. The Senate Report on the
legislation demonstrates this intention by stating that:
[I]n order that any drawback given by the country of exportation upon the
exportation of the merchandise, or any excise tax which is refunded or not
collected upon the exportation of the merchandise shall not constitute
dumping, it is necessary also to add such items to the purchase price. 64
Congress evidently understood the tax provision to mean that the addi-
tion to U.S. price would prevent the tax exemption on export from "con-
stituting dumping." During the 1919 hearings, Representative Kitchin
explained to the Ways and Means Committee that: "[T]he foreign excise
61 See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 134
(Tent. Final Draft 1985).
62 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 853 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 823 F. 2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
63 See Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, 42 Stat. 11, 13 (1921) (codified as amended
19 U.S.C. § 162 (1970)) (repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
144) [hereinafter Antidumping Act of 1921].
64 See S. REP. No. 16, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1921).
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tax levied on the article for domestic use and not levied on the exported
article, just as we do here, can have no possible connection with unfair
competition or dumping."65 It has been argued that the fact that a tax
adjustment is added to U.S. price indicates an intention to have dumping
margins calculated on a tax-inclusive basis. The legislative history of the
1921 Act does not support this argument. That history indicates that
Congress thought that it was eliminating consumption taxes from dump-
ing calculations, just as it was eliminating export duty drawbacks by ad-
ding them to U.S. price.66
B. The 1974 Amendments
The Trade Act of 1974 made two changes to the tax clause. First,
the phrase "[imposed] upon the manufacturer, producer, or seller in re-
spect to the manufacture, production, or sale" was replaced with the
phrase "directly upon the exported merchandise or components
thereof."67 Secondly, a clause was added limiting the addition to U.S.
price "to the extent [the home-market tax was] added to or included in
the price of" home-market sales.68 As revised, the clause directs Com-
merce to add to U.S. price:
[T]he amount of any taxes imposed in the country of exportation directly
upon the exported merchandise or components thereof, which have been
rebated, or which have not been collected, by reason of the exportation of
the merchandise to the United States, but only to the extent that such taxes
are added to or included in the price of such or similar merchandise when
sold in the country of exportation.69
Zenith ruled that the words "to the extent added to or included in
the price" require Commerce to measure the amount of tax "passed
through" (economically speaking) to home-market customers. The prob-
lem with this interpretation is that the tax clause does not say "passed
through," does not mention tax "burden" or "shifting," and does not
otherwise refer to tax incidence. The clause speaks of tax "added to or
included in" the price of such or similar merchandise in the home
market.
65 See Hearings on H.R. 9983 and H.R. 10071 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
66th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1919).
66 Duty drawback was also added to U.S. price, rather than subtracted from the home market
price, under the original 1921 statute. See Antidumping Act of 1921, supra note 63, at 42 Stat. 9.
67 Trade Act of 1974, Pub, L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2487 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1974].
68 Id. There were parallel changes in the then separate provisions on purchase price and ex-
porter's sales price. These two provisions have now been consolidated into a single provision on U.S.
price. Id. § 772, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1982).
69 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1982).
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The most literal reading of the requirement that the tax be "added
to" the home-market price requires that the company in fact add the tax
to that price. This condition is satisfied in any instance where there is
substantial evidence that the tax was charged and paid on the home-
market sales being compared. Similarly, the most literal reading of the
requirement that the tax be "included in the price" requires that the tax
have been added to that price, although it might be carried as a separate
item on the company's books, rather than listed as a separate item on
each sales receipt. ° Such a straightforward application of the tax clause
does not, and need not, address the issue of tax incidence. The fact that a
consumption tax that was added to and included in the home-market
price might not have been entirely borne by the consumer in an economic
sense is irrelevant.
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments supports this literal
reading of the new language that Congress added to the tax clause. The
bill originally introduced in the House71 did not contain the phrase "only
to the extent that such taxes are added to or included in the price." As a
result, although the House Committee held extensive hearings on H.R.
6767 in May and June of 1973,72 the transcripts do not contain a single
word regarding the meaning of those words.73 In fact, very little was
said during the hearings about the new requirement that the tax be levied
"directly" upon the exported merchandise.74
Those few participants who seemed aware that the rebate of con-
sumption taxes on export had economic implications also realized that
such rebates are explicitly sanctioned under the GATT. These persons
appear to have regarded the subject as essentially a subsidy issue, and to
have believed that any remedy would have to be obtained in the upcom-
ing round of multilateral trade negotiations. 75 For example, then-Treas-
ury Secretary Schultz testified that the proposed legislation "does not
affect the way in which the [European] value added tax is treated" under
70 The phrase "included in the price" is also used to qualify all of the adjustments to U.S. price
in the Trade Act of 1974 § 772(d)(2)(A) and (B), supra note 67, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2) (A) and (13)
(1982). There has never been any suggestion that a "pass-through" analysis is required in connec-
tion with these adjustments.
71 See H.R. 6767, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1973).
72 Trade Reform: Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Represent-
atives on H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter House Hearings].
73 Id.
74 Id. at 135, 362, 679, 778, 1022, 1357, 1576, 2153, 2158, 2242, 2397, 2710, 3028, 3274, 3957,
4022, 5246-53.
75 The legislation provided the President with authority to negotiate a comprehensive set of
trade agreements. Trade Act of 1974, supra note 67, at tit. I, ch. 1.
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U.S. law.7 6 A few moments later, Representative Flanigan referred to a
study (quoted in the transcript) concluding that rebates of indirect taxes
on export "are allowed under the provisions of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade."" The realization that export tax rebates are sanc-
tioned by GAIT evidently was widespread,78 and precluded considera-
tion of proposals fundamentally changing their treatment under the
antidumping law.
The Committee appears to have thought that the "directly upon the
exported merchandise" change made in the tax clause would help ensure
that the adjustment to U.S. price offset actual indirect tax rebates, rather
than countervailable subsidies in disguise.79 The change evidently was
viewed as tightening the requirement for the tax adjustments as far as
permissible under the GATT, consistent with the countervailing duty
law.80
On October 3, 1973, the Ways and Means Committee reported the
Trade Reform Act of 1973 to the full House. The reported bill bore-a
new number (H.R. 10710) and differed from the original version in many
respects.8 ' One of the changes was the addition to the tax clause of the
76 House Hearings, supra note 72, at 192-94, 334 (colloquy between Sec'y Schultz and Represent-
atives Griffiths and Flanigan). Secretary Schultz emphasized to Representative Vanik that: "It was
my understanding that the way this has operated over the years and with the GATT understanding
we have, that we are in the position where [export rebates of] the VAT [value added] type tax is not
considered an item against which we countervail."
77 See id. at 193.
78 Id. See Statement of Ambassador Eberle, it at 472; complaint of Mr. Robert Barnard, id. at
1724-34 ("Under an interpretation of the GATT apparently agreed to by the United States... an
indirect tax is treated as a tax on the product and may be assessed on imports at the border and
rebated on exports."). See also Statement by Representative Corman to Mr. Eugene Stewart, id. at
3847 ("[W]e don't consider the rebate or failure to collect VAT from a European country. That
doesn't get them in violation of the antidumping laws, does it?"); Tax Adjustments in International
Trade; GA 7T Provisions and EEC Practices, id. at 5127-37 ("[T]he GATT permits countries to ex-
empt exported products from domestic consumption taxes and to rebate to exporters such taxes as
may have been collected on the exported product.")
79 An example of such a subsidy would be a rebate of an income tax or an excessive rebate of a
consumption tax.
80 The second amendment deals with the treatment of certain types of tax rebates in comput-
ing purchase price. The amendment would conform the standard in the Antidumping Act to
the standard under the countervailing duty law, thereby harmonizing tax treatment under the
two statutes. However, your committee, in recommending this amendment, does not express
approval or disapproval of the standard employed by the Treasury Department in administering
the countervailing duty law with regard to the treatment under that law of rebates or remissions
of direct and indirect taxes.
Report of the Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 10710, H. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 69
(1973) [hereinafter Ways and Means Report on H.R. 10710].
Zenith confines this harmonizing intent to the first of the two 1974 changes. 633 F. Supp. at
1397. According to Zenith then, the first of the two 1974 changes insured that the statute was in"
harmony with GATT, while the second of those changes destroyed that harmony.
81 "[Tlhe bill that the committee has favorably reported is based on the President's trade propos-
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language "but only to the extent added to or included in the price ....
The transcript of the hearings contains no evidence of the reason for the
change. Summaries of H.R. 10710 gloss over the tax clause.83 The only
statement in the entire legislative history that provides any detail con-
cerning the new language is the House Report on H.R. 10710, which
states that:
With the amendment, no adjustment to the advantage of the foreign ex-
porter would be permitted for indirect tax rebates unless the direct relation-
ship of the tax to the product being exported, or components thereof, could
be demonstrated. Further, an adjustment for such tax rebates would be
permitted only to the extent that such taxes are added to or included in the
price of such or similar merchandise when sold in the country of exporta-
tion. This is to insure that the rebate of such taxes confers no special benefit
on the exporter of the merchandise that he does not enjoy in sales in his
home market. To the extent that the exporter absorbs indirect taxes in his
home market sales, no adjustments to purchase price will be made and the
likelihood or size of dumping margins will be increased.8 4
The Zenith court's analysis of the legislative history of the "added to
or included in" language is essentially based upon the emphasized ex-
cerpt from this statement. The court's analysis boils down to the as-
sumption that, when the report refers to "the extent that the exporter
absorbs indirect taxes in his home market sales," it means "to the extent
that the exporter bears the economic burden of the tax.""5 This is the
same assumption that the court had already made about the meaning of
"added to or included in the price" in the legislation itself. It is equally
unwarranted. The passage from the House Report is simply a para-
phrase of the tax clause. Although the word "absorbed" could be inter-
preted as alluding to tax incidence, it is also commonly employed by
accountants to describe the allocation of costs. 8 6 Consequently, its use in
als to the Congress embodied in H.R. 6767 ...." Ways and Means Report on H.R. 10710, supra
note 80, at 3.
82 Amendments to the Antidumping Act of 1921, H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (1973).
83 The Summary of Trade Reform Act of 1974 as ordered reported by the Committee on Fi-
nance (pp. 9-10 in the Nov. 20, 1974 version, and p. 12 in the Dec. 30, 1974 version) does not
mention the tax clause. (This summary appears in the CONG. REC. S21,273 (Dec. 12, 1974).) The
one exception is the Summary of the Principal Features of the Bill contained in the Report of the
Committee on Ways and Means, which provides simply that "Other amendments relate to the defi-
nition of purchase price for purposes of fair-market-value determinations and in the treatmeent of
certain tax rebates or remissions in the computation of the purchase price." Id. at 10.
84 Ways and Means Report on H.R. 10710, supra note 80, at 69 [emphasis added].
85 Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1396, 1399.
86 See, e.g., C. HORNGREN, CosT ACCOUNTING: A MANAGERIAL EMPHASIS 52 (5th ed. 1982)
("Two major methods of product costing will be emphasized in the book... absorption costing and
variable costing."); L. RAYBURN, PRINCIPLES OF CosT ACCOUNTING: MANAGERIAL APPLICA-
TIONS 223 (rev. ed. 1983) ("Under conventional, full, or absorption costing, both fixed and variable
overhead costs are applied to production."). This is not to suggest that the House Report used the
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the House Report does not indicate that the clause refers to tax
incidence.
The trade bill was debated on the House floor primarily on Decem-
ber 10 and 11, 1973.87 In that entire debate, there is not even one discus-
sion of the tax clause. The only statement concerning the clause that
appears in the Congressional Record is a virtual recitation of the passage
in the House Report.88 There is no evidence that any member of Con-
gress ever focused on the meaning of the words "added to or included in
the price."
The Senate held hearings on H.R. 10710 in March and April of
1974.89 The total failure of any of the participants in the hearings to
attribute any special significance to the new language in the tax clause
belies the CIT's claim in Zenith that its special economic implications
were unmistakable. Summaries of the legislation were simplified versions
of the House Report, lacking any reference to the new language, much
less any indication that it had far-reaching implications."
The change in the tax clause evidently was seen as tightening ex-
isting guidelines to insure that any rebates on export be directly tied to
the tax, in conformity with countervailing duty law.9" This goal was ac-
word "absorbed" in some specific technical accounting sense-only that the term "absorbed" is part
of the terminology ordinarily employed by accountants in discussing costs.
87 See H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 40,489-580, 40,769-814 (1973).
88 Id. at 40519 (statement of Mr. Ullman).
89 See Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearings before the Committee on Finance of the United States
Senate on H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
90 Id. at 310, 584.
A written question submitted to then-Treasury Secretary Schultz regarding whether it was "en-
visioned that the language in the House-passed bill would actually result in the exclusion of all or a
part of the European value added taxes" in determining dumping margins elicited the following
response:
The proposed amendments to the Antidumping Act would tighten the existing guidelines for
adding back rebated or remitted taxes to purchase price.... If it were to be determined in a
particular instance that such taxes are not directly imposed upon the merchandise or that di-
rectly imposed taxes were not included in the foreign home market prices of such or similar
merchandise, they will not be added to purchase price or exporter's sales price. In such circum-
stances, the amendment in question would tend to create or increase the size of dumping mar-
gins. Apart from such special circumstances, however, it would not result in the exclusion of
the European value added taxes in determining dumping margins.
Id. at 504-05. Thus, Secretary Schultz's understanding, which he conveyed to the Committee, was
that the change in the tax clause would alter the treatment of VAT rebates by European governments
only in "special circumstances."
91 The Senate Report stated that: "The standard in the proposed amendment parallels that stan-
dard employed by the Treasury Department under the countervailing duty law in determining
whether tax rebates and remissions constitute bounties or grants." S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 172 (1974). The CIT rejected this evidence on the theory that such statements in the legislative
history were limited to the first of the two changes (the "directly related" language) in the tax clause
made by H.R. 10710. 633 F. Supp. 1397-98. The CIT's argument fails because the legislative his-
tory does not indicate that any clear distinction was seen between the two changes. Instead, it
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complished by requiring that the tax not only be "directly related" to the
exported merchandise, but that the tax actually have been "added to or
included in" its home-market price.92 Together, the two requirements
insured that adjustments were permitted only to offset consumption taxes
that were actually charged and paid on the sales used to calculate for-
eign-market value-the strictest limitation that could be imposed on the
adjustment consistent with the GATT.
As in the hearings before the House, witnesses who testified before
the Senate about the amendments to the antidumping law gave the revi-
sion to the tax clause only passing mention and certainly gave no indica-
tion that they imagined it might require Treasury to make routine
measurements of tax incidence. 93 Conversely, those rare individuals who
seemed aware of the possible economic implications of the broader tax-
rebate issue apparently perceived no connection between that issue and
H.R. 107 10. 94
The Senate Finance Committee's report on H.R. 10710 was pub-
lished on November 26, 1974. The discussion of the tax clause in that
report is a paraphrase of the House Report,95 with one important excep-
indicates that the second change was seen simply as tightening the first. This is particularly evident
from the Senate Report, which was written after the appearance of the new language, and does not
make any distinction between the two changes.
92 This had always been the administration's understanding of the function of the clause. For
example, the Assistant Treasury Secretary for Legislative Affairs observed that: "If a tax is imposed
in the home market of an exporting country and effectively added to the price of the merchandise
there, the failure to add such a tax to the price of the merchandise to the United States, if it is
rebated or remitted upon exportation, would distort any price comparisons and unfairly create or
increase the size of dumping margins." House Hearings, supra note 72 (letter from Assistant Treas-
ury Secretary for Legislative Affairs to the Chief Counsel of the Ways and Means Committee, June
5, 1973).
93 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 1548 (testimony of the American Chain Associa-
tion); id. at 1593 (statement of the New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry); id. at 1683
(testimony in behalf of the Electronic Industries Association); id. at 1934 (testimony of Mr. Noel
Hemmendinger); id. at 1966 (statement of National Retail Merchants Association); id. at 2105
(statement of Nelson A. Stitt, Director, United States Japan Trade Council); id. at 2663 (statement
of Freeport Minerals Company); id. at 2795 (statement of Eugene L. Stewart on behalf of four
domestic producers of flat glass).
94 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 1294, 1304 (testimony of Mr. Robert Barnard on
behalf of the synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association). Mr. Barnard also testified
before the House about the problem presented by the rebates, House Hearings, supra note 72, so he
was obviously attuned to the issue. Yet, he plainly perceived no connection between the economic
aspects of the tax rebate issue and the amendments to the tax clause, for he was still urging a change
in the GATT as the only solution to the problem. Similarly, Mr. Irving R. Glass, President of the
Tanners' Council of America, Inc., discussed the European VAT problem with Senator Packwood
without either man suggesting that the changes in the tax clause had affected it in any significant
way. Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 1919.
95 The passage in the Senate Report reads:
These House amendments [to the Act] have been adopted without change in the Committee
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tion. The Senate Report omits most of even the limited explanation in
the House Report of the words "to the extent that such taxes are added
to or included in the price," including the word "absorbed," which plays
such an important role in the Zenith decision. 96 It is therefore reason-
able to conclude that the authors of the Senate report did not consider
that language to be especially important or informative.
The Senate debate on H.R. 1071097 closely replicated the debate
more than a year earlier in the House. The summary of the bill's signifi-
cant provisions inserted into the Congressional Record does not mention
any of the amendments to the tax clause,98 nor does a table summarizing
the provisions of the House bill and Senate amendments. 99 Although
additional language had been added to the tax clause amendment in the
original bill (which would normally attract attention to the provision),
there is no discussion whatsoever in the Congressional Record of the
meaning of the new language. The same is true of the discussion in the
House of the Conference version of the bill."°°
In sum, Congress never debated or discussed the tax clause (and
made even superficial references to it only on rare occasions) during the
House or Senate debates. 10 This absence of any debate, or even specula-
tion, about the meaning of the clause is especially significant when the
huge cast of administration and private trade law experts involved in the
legislative proceedings is taken into account. Had the amendments been
perceived to have economic implications that would drastically affect the
administration of the antidumping laws, they unquestionably would have
been the subject of fierce debate. Such a debate would have centered on
the fairness of such a change in the law, its consistency with the GATT,
bill.... The second amendment deals with the treatment of certain types of tax rebates in
computing purchase price and would provide that foreign indirect taxes, rebated or remitted
upon export... will be added back to purchase price ... only to the extent that such taxes are
added to or included in the price of such or similar merchandise when sold in the country of
exportation. The present standard for the treatment of such tax rebates or remissions which is
now contained in the Act is significantly broader and requires the adding back to the purchase
price of a wider range of taxes, to the advantage of the foreign manufacturer, than would be
allowed under the proposed amendment. The standard in the proposed amendment parallels
that standard employed by the Treasury Department under the countervailing duty law in de-
termining whether tax rebates and remissions constitute bounties or grants.
Report of the Committee on Finance on H.R. 10710, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 172
(1974).
96 See Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1399.
97 120 CONG. REC. 39,385, 39,415-19, 39,497-500, 39,503-534, 39,563-64, 39,754-858 (1974).
98 120 CONG. REC. 39,510 (1974).
99 rd. at 39,516.
100 120 CONG. REc. 41,592 (1974) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Con-
ference).
101 The transcripts to these debates run over 500 pages. See 119 CONG. REC. 40,489-580, 40,769-
814 (1973); 120 CONG. REC. 38,390-449, 39,385-565, 39,754-858, 41,629-52 (1974).
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and whether measurements of tax incidence were either theoretically or
practically achievable.
C. The 1979 Re-Enactment
Effective January 1, 1980, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 re-
pealed the antidumping law then in force and replaced it with a new
antidumping statute. The new statute re-enacted the tax clause incorpo-
rating the 1974 amendments verbatim. 0 2 The re-enactment is significant
because the legislative history of the 1979 law states explicitly that it was
intended to be (and, as far as the Congress was aware, was) consistent
with the GATT.I0 3 Furthermore, Congress was aware that consumption
tax rebates were not considered unfair trade practices under the
GATT. 104
It is not surprising that neither the Senate nor the House report con-
tains any indication that the tax clause, as amended in 1974, might be
inconsistent with the GATT. No interpretation of the tax clause incon-
sistent with the GATT was developed until the administrative review
that led to Zenith. Taken as a whole, the legislative history of the tax
clause demonstrates an intent to remove consumption taxes from an-
tidumping equations, while preventing unwarranted adjustments from
being made under the guise of tax adjustments.
V. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
A. The Smith-Corona Decision
Smith-Corona Group v. United States'05 is the landmark decision on
Commerce's authority to adjust prices in each market under the an-
102 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 101, 106(a), 107, 93 Stat. 144, 150,
193 (1979). The 1979 Act combined the purchase price and exporters sales price provisions of the
old act into one new section-772. The tax clause in the new consolidated section is identical to that
which the 1974 Act brought about in the two old provisions.
103 The Senate Finance Committee's Report on the legislation stated: "General Rule-Subtitle B
of title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the bill, would repeal the Antidumping Act, 1921,
and replace it with a comprehensive statute built upon the 1921 Act and consistent with the MTN
Antidumping Code." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1979).
Similarly, the House Report described the new antidumping law as "encompass[ing] those
changes to the current... antidumping laws necessary or appropriate to the implementation of the
international agreements on these subjects." H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong.; Ist Sess. 45 (1979).
104 The Senate Report also noted: "There are additional special rules in Article VI [of the GATT]
... prohibiting imposition of [antidumping and countervailing] duties solely for the nonexcessive
remission of consumption taxes, e.g., for border tax adjustments such as those employed in value-
added tax systems. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1979).




tidumping law.1" 6 The case arose from an antidumping investigation of
portable electric typewriters from Japan.10 7 In conducting that investiga-
tion, Commerce made C-O-S adjustments to foreign-market value for
freight, packing, advertising, and similar home market expenses.10 8
Smith-Corona (the domestic petitioner) challenged both the manner in
which these adjustments were calculated and the regulations under
which they were made. 09 The Court of International Trade upheld the
adjustments110 and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Two of the issues in Smith-Corona are important here: (1) whether
Commerce could allow the so-called "ESP offset" C-O-S adjustment for
home-market expenses not "directly related" to home-market sales
(which relates to the consumption tax C-O-S adjustment issue); and (2)
whether Commerce had authority to make those C-O-S adjustments on
the basis of cost (which relates to the tax pass-through issue). The rul-
ings are discussed separately below.
L The "'ESP Offset" Adjustment
In calculating dumping margins, Commerce attempts to compare ex
factory prices in each market. A number of adjustments to the selling
price in each market must be made for this purpose, including adjust-
ments for differences in the circumstances of sale, such as differences be-
tween the two markets in freight, insurance, credit, or warranty
expenses." 1
106 See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 783 F.2d 184 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Consumer Prods.
Div., SCM Corp. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Rhone Poulenc, S.A. v. United
States, 592 F. Supp. 1318 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984); Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Sawhill Tubular Div. Cyclops Corp. v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 1550 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987); Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 633 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); LMI-La
Metalli Industriale v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 959, motion denied, 720 F. Supp. 176 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1989).
107 See Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan; Antidumping; Determination of Duty, 45 Fed.
Reg. 53,853 (1980); Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan; Antidumping Duty Order, 45 Fed.
Reg. 30,618 (1980).
108 Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1573 n.12.
109 Id. at 1574-75.
110 Brother Indus. v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 1341 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), aff'd sub nom,
Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir.), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1922).
111 Section 773(a)(4) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (1982), provides that:
In determining foreign market value, if it is established to the satisfaction of the administering
authority that the amount of any difference between the United States price and the foreign
market value ... is wholly or partly due to... (B)... differences in circumstances of sale...
then due allowance shall be made therefor.
Thus, to the extent that Commerce is satisfied that the amount of "any difference" between the
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The term "circumstances of sale" is not defined in the Act.1 12 Nor
does the legislative history shed much light on the meaning of the
term.1 13 The House and Senate Reports give the following identical ex-
planation of the new provision:
Differences due to "other circumstances of sale"
Under the bill as reported, provision is made... for consideration of
"other differences in circumstances of sale" in addition to quantity differen-
tials. This is designed to facilitate efficient and fair comparison between
foreign market value and price to the United States market. Examples
would be differences in terms of sale, credit terms, and advertising and sell-
ing costs.114
The list of examples plainly is not exhaustive. The passage indicates sim-
ply that Commerce should account for a broad range of differences in
circumstances-of-sale. The only limitations on such adjustments are
those established by the need to make an "efficient and fair" comparison
between FMV and U.S. price.
Traditionally, however, Commerce has limited C-O-S adjustments
to those that bear a "direct" relationship to the comparison sales.115
Both the old and new regulations provide that, in general, such adjust-
ments are limited to those that bear a "direct relationship" to the sales
being compared. Direct expenses (e.g., freight) are those that would not
have been incurred but for the sale in question. Indirect expenses (e.g.,
advertising) fail this causal test.
The exporter's sales price ("ESP") offset adjustment provides a par-
tial exception to the "directly related" requirement. It permits the de-
duction of indirect selling expenses from foreign-market value up to the
amount of comparable U.S. selling expenses. 16 The ESP offset is not
specifically provided for in the statute, but was created by Treasury (and
adhered to by Commerce) in order to reduce the unfairness inherent in
including expenses that were not part of the U.S. price within foreign-
112 The C-O-S adjustment was created by the 1958 amendments to the Antidumping Act. See
Antidumping Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 85-630, § 202(b), 72 Stat. 583 (1958).
113 The Federal Circuit found in Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1578, that "the legislative history and
the legislative purpose are ambiguous" on the C-O-S provision.
114 Report of the Committee on Ways and Means to Accompany H.R. 6006, H. REP. No. 1261,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1957); Report of the Committee on Finance to Accompany H.R. 6006, S.
REP. No. 1619, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958).
115 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(a) (1988), recodified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a) (1989). Both the old and
new regulations provide that, in general, such adjustments are limited to those that bear a "direct
relationship" to the sales being compared.
116 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(C) (1988), recodified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b)(2) (1989). The adjust-
ment is called the "ESP offset" because such expenses normally exist only on "Exporters Sales
Price" sales (sales by related U.S. firms).
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market price.117 In the typewriters investigation, Commerce allowed a
variety of "ESP offset" C-O-S adjustments, including one for home mar-
ket advertising expenses. 8 These adjustments were challenged by
Smith-Corona on the basis that the expenses in question were not "di-
rectly related" to home market sales.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that, in allowing adjustments to
foreign-market value for such indirect expenses as advertising expenses,
the ESP offset went beyond the explicit command of the statute.1 9 The
Court nevertheless sustained the ESP offset on the basis that it was neces-
sary to achieve a fair comparison between FMV and U.S. price. In the
words of the court: "One of the goals of the statute is to guarantee that
the administering authority makes the fair value comparison on a fair
basis-comparing apples with apples ... . [The statute] expressly re-
quires a fair comparison."' 20
If the ESP offset is a permissible C-O-S adjustment, an adjustment
to equalize consumption taxes in each market is permissible a fortiori,
because consumption taxes, like freight or credit expenses, are directly
related to each sale. Commerce has long taken the position that differ-
ences in taxation are essentially no different than any other differences in
expenses between the two markets. 121
The Zenith decision does not analyze Commerce's authority to
make C-O-S adjustments and then explain why a tax-differential adjust-
117 See, eg., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Study of Antidumping Adjustments Methodology and
Recommendations for Statutory Change (Nov. 1985).
118 See Portable Electric Typewriters From Japan; Antidumping: Withholding of Appraisement
Notice, 45 Fed. Reg. 1220, 1221 (1980). In Portable Electric Typewriters From Japan; Antidump-
ing Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,416 (1980), Commerce ex-
plained that: "(Aippropriate adjustments were made to the home market price for differences in
circumstances of sales for expenses incurred for advertising (eg. newspaper, radio commercial, cal-
endar) regarded as general media advertising directed to later sales by the purchasers."
119 Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1581.
120 Id. at 1578.
121 In Grand and Upright Pianos From the Republic of Korea; Final Determination of Sales at
Not Less Than Fair Value., 50 Fed. Reg. 37,561, 37,564 (1985), Commerce explained this policy as
follows:
Ihe Department can perceive no economic justification for adjusting the home market U.S.
price differential by anything less than the actual amount of final stage taxes paid by the produ-
cers. We believe that the antidumping duty law is intended to remedy situations in which a
foreign producer accepts a lesser return on his U.S. sales than on his home market sales. Where
the costs of production and sale are identical in both markets, any difference in price will repre-
sent a difference in return. Where the costs of production and sale differ between markets, any
difference in price will represent a difference in return only after the price differential has been
adjusted by the net amount of the differences in cost. A difference in final stage tax liability is
just as much a difference in the cost of production and sale as any difference in material costs or
credit expenses. Therefore, just as we have always adjusted the price differential by the amount
of any difference in material costs and credit expenses, we believe we should also make such an
adjustment for any difference in final stage tax liability.
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ment exceeds that authority. Rather, the Court treated the C-O-S adjust-
ment as a subset of the tax issue.122 Its analysis of the C-O-S provision is
limited to noting that differences in taxation are not contained in the
non-exhaustive illustrative lists in the statute and regulations of the types
of expenses for which C-O-S adjustments may be made.123
The remainder of the Zenith opinion argues that permitting C-O-S
adjustments to offset the multiplier effect would thwart Congress' intent
in requiring the addition to U.S. price of inflating dumping margins. 124
There is no evidence, however, that Congress had any notion that the
addition of the tax to the U.S. price would produce the multiplier ef-
fect. 25 The CIT buttressed its speculation that Congress intended to in-
flate dumping margins by incorrectly placing the burden on Commerce
of demonstrating that Congress did not intend to create the multiplier
effect. 126 Finally, Zenith incorrectly justified the "multiplier effect" as
permissible punishment for dumping.127 The CIT has correctly recog-
nized elsewhere that the antidumping law is remedial, rather than penal,
in design. 128
2. Cost-Based Adjustments
Like the tax clause, the C-O-S provision directs adjustments to be
made in calculating dumping margins that arguably could be calculated
in terms of either cost or value. In the typewriters investigation, Com-
merce deducted the difference between the amount by which the cost of
such expenses in the home market exceeded their cost in the United
States.129 Smith-Corona challenged these adjustments on the basis that
Commerce had failed to demonstrate that the Japanese manufacturers
had actually "passed through" the full amount of the higher home-mar-
ket expenses to their customers. Commerce responded that it was enti-
tled to assume that the full difference in cost was reflected in the final
price under the circumstances (and therefore was properly deducted
122 See Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1393.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1389-91.
125 In place of the missing evidence, the court substituted the observation that Congress could
have made calculations demonstrating the multiplier effect, and then jumped to the conclusion that
Congress did make such calculations, and so knew that dumping margins could be inflated. Id. at
1391.
126 "[T]he court is unpersuaded that Congress did not intend the adjustment in § 1677(d)(1)(C)
to operate as it does." Id.
127 1d. at 1392.
128 See, e.g., Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653, 656 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
129 Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1574.
Border Tax Rebates
10:213(1989)
from that price). 130
The CIT sustained Commerce's assumption regarding home-market
expenses on the basis of Commerce's broad discretion under the statute,
"the economic logic of the assumption that cost is related to price, and
the longstanding administrative practice of using [the] cost" differential
as the amount of the adjustment.1 31 These considerations also proved
persuasive to the Federal Circuit on appeal. In particular, although the
Federal Circuit acknowledged that "[a]ntidumping duties are imposed
on the basis of differences in value, not differences in cost, ' 132 and
although it cautioned that Commerce may not "blindly rely on cost to
the exclusion of its effect on value," 133 it concluded that, "absent evi-
dence that costs do not reflect value, [Commerce] may reasonably con-
clude that cost and value are directly related." '134
As in the C-O-S adjustments at issue in Smith-Corona, Commerce's
decision to make the consumption tax adjustment on the basis of cost
was reasonable. The adjustment is not, as the CIT claimed in Zenith, a
"brazen" leap to a purely cost-based view of the statute.135 Rather, it
reflects Commerce's judgment that, absent evidence to the contrary, it
may use cost as a stand-in for value where there is logically a direct rela-
tionship between the two. As the Federal Circuit noted in Smith-Corona:
"The ready availability of cost data that can be employed without exten-
sive complex econometric analysis supports the reasonableness of the
Secretary's decision to rely on cost. Cost may be the only practical way
to administer the statute."' 136
In sum, both holdings of Smith-Corona support the calculation of
dumping margins on a tax-net basis. The holding that Commerce has
broad power to make C-O-S adjustments in order to compare prices
fairly supports Commerce's C-O-S adjustment to equalize taxes in the
two markets, so that prices can be compared on a tax-net basis. The
holding that Commerce may make adjustments on the basis of cost, even
where value provides a potential alternative basis, if that is the only prac-
tical way to administer the statute, supports Commerce's refusal to mea-
sure tax incidence.
130 Id. at 1574.
131 Id. at 1575. The CIT referred to the issue as the "casual link" issue. Brother Indus. v. United
States, 540 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
132 Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1575.
133 Id. at 1577 n.26.
134 Id.
135 Zenith, 633 F. Supp. at 1401.
136 Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1577 n.27.
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B. The Atcor Decision
Atcor v. United States 37 involved a challenge to an antidumping de-
termination on pipe and tube from India. Two Indian taxes were in-
volved: a tax on imported steel ultimately sold in India; and a general
tax on domestic sales. The Indian companies in question purchased im-
ported steel to manufacture pipe and tube for export. Accordingly, they
paid neither tax. Commerce added both Indian taxes to the U.S. price,
based on its determination that the taxes were forgiven by reason of the
exportation of the final product. Atcor challenged the import levy (and,
to a lesser extent, the general sales tax) on the basis that it had been
forgiven solely by reason of the importation of the steel, rather than the
exportation of the finished pipe and tube.
The CIT upheld both additions to U.S. price as taxes "that would
[have been] included in the home market prices," had the exported pipe
and tube been sold in India.' 38 Because the precise amount of taxes that
would have been assessed against the pipe and tube had it been sold in
India had not been verified, the Court remanded the proceeding to Com-
merce for verification of this figure. 39 Thus, in Atcor, the CIT read the
"added to or included in" requirement as Commerce does, to require
simply that any tax added to U.S. price actually be included in the price
of home-market sales.t4°
C. The Paver Parts Decision
In the Paver Parts decision,14 1 the U.S.-Canada Bi-National Panel
("Panel") directly addressed the issue of whether 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(d)(1)(C) requires a measurement of home-market tax incidence,
and ruled that it does not. 42 The Panel's decision echoes that of the
137 Atcor v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 295 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
138 Id. at 303 (Court's emphasis).
139 Id. at 303-04.
140 The Court stated that:
Section 1677a(d)(1)(C) allows an adjustment in the amount of taxes imposed in India directly
upon the merchandise exported to the United States which have been rebated by reason of the
exportation. The adjustment is allowed only to the extent such taxes are added to or included in
the price of such or similar merchandise when sold in India. This provision allows for an
adjustment in the amount of taxes paid that are rebated. It does not allow adjustment for
simply any amount that has been rebated.
Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
141 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
142 The Panel explicitly rejected the CIT's reliance in Zenith on the word "absorbs" in the legisla-
tive history of the tax clause:
We agree that the 1973 House Report's use of the single term "absorbs" does not compel Com-
merce to measure tax incidence in an economic sense. If Congress had contemplated such a
burdensome requirement-one that could not readily be performed with confidence or within




Federal Circuit in Smith Corona and of the CIT in Atcor:
Absent evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that when a
manufacturer is selling merchandise at a profit, it is recovering all of its
costs, including the taxes, and, therefore, all costs are "included" in the
customer's price.
We read the statute as requiring substantial evidence that the taxes are paid
on sales within the home market. Commerce indeed insists that it requires
respondents to provide evidence that the manufacturer has actually paid the
tax and that the sales receipts reflect that the manufacturer "added [the tax]
to or included [it] in" the price paid by home-market purchasers. Where
Commerce fails to conduct such an inquiry, its determination is subject to
remand.' 4 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The desire to calculate tax-net dumping margins is the common
ground for Commerce's C-O-S adjustment to equalize the consumption
taxes in the foreign and U.S. markets and Commerce's refusal to place
any limitation on the tax adjustment based on tax incidence in the home
market. This Article has shown that Commerce's practice is grounded in
sound reasons of policy and comports with the GATT principle that ex-
port tax rebates are not an unfair trade practice and should not be subject
to any trade law remedies. The legislative history of the tax clause, and
the judicial approach to dumping adjustments, are both consistent with
this GATT principle. Finally, the theory that the tax adjustment (or the
entire antidumping law) should be placed on an economic basis is fraught
with many problems that have only begun to be explored.
been more explicit about their intent. We doubt that this methodology was ever considered,
much less agreed upon, by the drafters of the legislation.
Paver Parts, supra note 32, at 18.
143 Id. at 16.
